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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of organizational turnover on firm survival within the Dutch
accounting service industry during the period 1880-1986. We address three issues: (1) estimating
the effect of organizational turnover on organizational dissolution; (2) showing the significance of
propinquity in isolating that effect; (3) exposing population dynamics through different levels of
analysis. The results of our analysis confirm that turnover is an important endogenous force
shaping the evolution of localized populations of organizations. The risk of organizational
dissolution increases when turnover entails losses of human and social capital (e.g. long-term
owners) and disruption of organizational routines. The results also show that such risk is even
higher when organizational members join a competitor or found a new venture within the same
geographical area.
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Turnover has been shown to have important implications for organizational performance.
It has been long recognized to affect processes of organizational learning and unlearning
(e.g. Levitt and March, 1988; Argote and Ophir, 2002). Although some authors (March,
1991; Simon, 1991) have stressed how firms can enhance innovation and creativity by
replacing old members with new ones, turnover often triggers internal disruptions that
raise the risk of firm dissolution. The exit of organizational members may in fact unravel
the smooth functioning of existing routines (see Rao and Drazin, 2002; Sørensen, 2001).
Furthermore, it also undermines performance especially when a firm loses valuable
human and social capital to rival firms.
A good deal of work on organizational turnover has been oriented to teams, most
commonly top management teams and their CEOs (e.g. Castanias and Helfat, 1991), and
to the impact on the moving member’s performance (e.g. Groysberg and Nanda, 2001;
Harris and Helfat, 1997). Yet, while the interest in the effect of organizational turnover
on firm performance is clearly increasing, much of the work to date has been devoid of
empirical tests. Furthermore, quite surprisingly there is only “little published research
directly linking personnel flows to population level processes” (Wade et al., 1999: 136).
 3
To this end, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we examine the effect of
organizational turnover on firm performance. Second, while inter-firm mobility often
involves two firms, the donor and recipient firms, the effects of such inter-firm transfer
have never been explicitly addressed. The effects might take on a rather different
significance depending on whether or not the two firms are competitively interdependent,
like when they operate within the same geographically proximate environment. Thus,
drawing on the recent findings of research on spatial heterogeneity (e.g. Greve, 2000) we
advance this line of inquiry investigating whether the disruptive effects of organizational
turnover are most pronounced under conditions of propinquity.
Such inquiry leads us to explore the link between micro- (i.e., individual) and macro-
level (i.e., organization, population) phenomena and illustrate their interaction in shaping
the evolution of the industry. We analyze data on the entire population of Dutch
accounting firms during the period 1880-1986. The longitudinal character of the study
allows tracking such effects as they unfold over time. We also believe the service
industry to represent an ideal setting to study the effects of organizational turnover on
firm dissolution for at least two reasons. First, the departure of professionals – especially
partners (i.e., the owners of the firm) – has important implications for the functioning
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and often even the survival of an organization. Second, since the relationships between
professionals and clients tend to be local, the industry is highly suitable for testing spatial
heterogeneity hypotheses.
THEORY
The theoretical framework underpinning our analysis has been mapped out in Figure 1.
We distinguish between two causal pathways between turnover and organizational
dissolution: a direct and indirect path. Turnover affects odds of survival directly as
departure of organizational members harms the firm’s integrity of complementary and
shared routines. This accords with theoretical reasoning (Hannan and Freeman, 1984)
and some empirical evidence (e.g., Rao and Drazin, 2002).
We also assume an indirect effect because turnover alters the firm’s competitive context.
The implicit loss of human (individual skills and knowledge) and social (relation with
clients) capital influences organizational performance and survival when organizational
members join another firm or start a new venture. In the latter case density – and
competition for scarce resources alike – increases in the geographical area in which a
new firm is founded. The effect of turnover is ‘indirect’ because its impact on
organizational dissolution is conditional on the increase in competitive pressures.
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The overall effect of organizational turnover – both direct and indirect – is moderated by
the status of the defecting organizational members, local experience at the firm level and
the influence of locational factors (spatial heterogeneity). The departure of members
carrying valuable human and social capital – like owners (ex: partners in service
accounting firms) and other key individuals – is deemed to be more harmful than the
departure of less critical members. Thus, a firm’s dissolution increases (1) when turnover
involves partners; and (2) when those who left joined a competitor or founded a new firm
located in the focal firm’s vicinity. In the next two sections we further elaborate on these
points.
Figure 1 about here
The Individual and the Organization
Organizational turnover undermines the long-term viability of a firm when the exodus of
individuals translates into a loss of valuable human capital. The resource-based view of
the firm, for instance, has pointed to intangible assets as the foundation of a firm’s
advantage so long as these assets are rare, difficult to imitate and substitute, and non-
tradeable on the market (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986 and 1991; Dierickx and Cool,
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1989). As individuals are the repositories of a firm’s knowledge, organizational turnover
can raise the risk of organizational dissolution in industries where the control over
knowledge-based resources is crucial. Not surprisingly, existing firms often acquire new
knowledge by ‘poaching’ skilled individuals from peer firms (Flides, 1990; Baum and
Ingram, 1998). Furthermore, existing routines or established social relationships inside
and outside the organization are often irreversibly altered and disrupted as well. An
organization often mitigates the impact of the loss of human capital by recruiting new
individuals. March (1991), for example, argues that a moderate level of turnover and
replacing departing members with new recruits engenders further exploration. Bringing
in individuals not yet socialized into the organizational norms and values and not yet
exposed to existing practices and routines fosters exploratory search and eventually
creation of new knowledge.
In this study, we draw from theories on structural inertia, organizational learning,
evolutionary economics and social capital. Although through different theoretical lenses,
all these theories share the basic idea that an organization can be conceived of as bundles
of routines. Routines consist of previously learned patterns of action and express what is
regular and predictable conduct (Nelson and Winter, 1982). They embody organizational
knowledge and memory. Since routines ensure the efficient and smooth functioning of an
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organization, any disruptive event that unravels existing bundles increases the risk of
organizational dissolution (Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett, 1993).
In their 1984 article, Hannan and Freeman have argued that organizations strive towards
consistency of replication and high levels of reliability and accountability to withstand
the negative selection of the environment. As organizations evolve over time, and
enhance their practices, routines become well established and acquire further
consistency. The institutionalization of organizational structures, processes and routines
renders them taken-for-granted and widespread, thus conferring legitimacy. Stable and
reproducible routines are in fact the foundation of reliable performance. Since the ability
to reproduce a structure with high fidelity strengthens resistance to change, structural
inertia is the end result of selection. Yet, organizational turnover can seriously weaken
this ability and even undermine the long-term viability of a firm. Pressures against
turnover, therefore, stem from the path-dependent nature of organizational learning.
Organizational learning tends to be incremental and anchored in routines that evolve only
gradually over time in response to the degree to which outcomes conform to predefined
aspiration levels (Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1994).
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Similarly, Nelson and Winter (1982) have highlighted the disruptive effects triggered by
organizational turnover. In particular, they maintain “the memories of individual
organization members are a primary repository of the operational knowledge of the
organization. Some part of the information thus stored may be readily replaced if the
particular member storing it leaves the organization … But in some cases the memory of
a single organization member may be the sole storage point of knowledge that is both
idiosyncratic and of great importance to the organization” (1982: 115). Although
organizational memory does not coincide with individual memory, the latter constitutes
the primary organizational repository of operational knowledge, particularly long-tenured
individuals who are highly instrumental in retrieving information and knowledge (Walsh
and Ungson, 1991). As knowledge is often tacit, the “loss of an employee with such
important idiosyncratic knowledge poses a major threat to the continuity of routine –
indeed, if the departure is unanticipated, continuity is necessarily broken” (1982: 115).
The continuity of routines is seriously undermined when, like in the case of personnel
turnover, established patterns of activity are jolted and an organization is unable to keep
things under control. Besides the level of tacitness of the knowledge a newly hired
individual has to assimilate, such continuity in turn depends on “the degree to which
experience during the training period is representative of the full job, and – importantly –
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whether the incumbent really wants to succeed in imparting the knowledge to its
successor” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 116-117).
Furthermore, organizational turnover erodes the firm’s social capital, and this too might
trigger organizational dissolution. By social capital we do not simply mean the
“supporting relationships with other economic actors, most notably, potential clients”
(Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostuijn, 1998: 426), but also the web of internal
relationships among individuals (and groups of individuals) within a given organization.
This concept pertains to linkages among actors inside and outside the organization, and is
consistent with that proposed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998).1 Organizations endowed
with social capital have superior access to valuable resources and are likely to exhibit
superior performance (Burt, 1992). Research on social networks has indeed demonstrated
how internal ties significantly improve the outcomes of an organization’s problem-
solving activity (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Argote, 1999; Hansen, 1999).
Just as internal relationships (e.g., among organizational members) provide resources in
the form of collectively shared skills and complementary knowledge pools, so do
external relationships. External contacts are among the organization’s most valuable
resources (Burt, 1992). Although true in general, particularly in service industries the
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success of an organization hinges on the ability to deliver high-quality services and to
attract and retain clients (Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Ceteris paribus,
new clients will choose a firm on the basis of previous interpersonal relationships with
its professionals. Organizations benefit from members endowed with valuable social
capital (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1996). Thus, the loss of human capital due to
organizational turnover produces a loss of social capital as well. The migration of
individuals alters webs of social relationships, both internal and external, and has
potentially harmful consequences for the firm. This applies a fortiori to partnerships,
which are the dominant organizational form in this industry. The effect of losing access
to valuable resources through such individuals’ social networks and relations (Lin, Burt
and Cook, 2001) is even stronger when human and social capital spill over to peer firms
– which intensifies competition for scarce resources. Although new recruits can endow a
firm with new valuable social capital, such contacts need to be properly harmonized with
pre-existing ones. Furthermore, as turnover often reveals “low levels of social integration
or attachment to fellow group members” (Sørensen, 2001: 4), allegiance to the
organization decreases. Loss of social capital should therefore manifest higher odds of
dissolution.
 11
In brief, the survival of an organization, especially in service industries, hinges on the
ability to preserve the internal ties through which organizational members share skills
and knowledge, and the external ties that enhance their ability to attract and retain clients
(Smigel, 1969; Maister, 1993), as social relationships with clients mediate economic
transactions (Granovetter, 1985). As indicated in Figure 1, the migration of
organizational members raises the risk of organizational dissolution, directly, by
unraveling existing routines; indirectly, by causing a loss of valuable human and social
capital. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Organizational turnover increases the chance of organizational
dissolution.
The Organization and the Environment
Besides the disruptive effects due to individual departures, turnover also raises the risk of
organizational dissolution by triggering changes in ecological conditions. Although
different types of turnover can be observed – organizational members become either
unemployed, retire or find employment in other industries – in evolutionary terms the
implications are most interesting when such members join a competitor or found a new
venture within the same industry. Organizational turnover represents one of the avenues
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through which skills and knowledge (human capital) become transferred spatially and
temporally. Similarly, not only do individuals migrate from organization to organization,
but also pre-existing relationships with clients often follow similar migratory patterns –
especially if within the same local market. Movements of employees in the geographical
proximity of the firm amplify the consequences of a loss of human and social capital as
well as the disruption of existing routines. The harmful effect of organizational turnover
is stronger when it occurs locally and entails the creation of a new firm. Several
empirical studies have shown how an increase in density produces stronger competitive
pressures on neighboring organizations than on more distant ones (Baum and Haveman,
1997; Lomi, 1995; Sørenson and Audia, 2000). By re-shaping these features through the
reallocation of critical resources among existing players (e.g., an individual joining an
existing organization) or the emergence of new players (e.g., an individual starting up a
new organization), organizational turnover shall be seen as a key factor of industry
dynamics.
Drawing from research on spatial heterogeneity, we argue that a deeper understanding of
the link between macro (population) and micro (organization and individual)
evolutionary processes, and their interaction over time, can be attained by examining
such processes at a less aggregate level. Populations of organizations are hardly
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homogeneous entities: geographical factors produce organizational heterogeneity. The
study of the relation between geography and organizations has a long tradition that traces
back to the early work of Park (1926), Hawley (1950) and McKenzie (1968). According
to these authors human activities tend to assume an orderly arrangement in space, which
ultimately leads to the formation of ‘human ecologies’ whose boundaries are spatially or
geographically delimited. Although these boundaries evolve – and even disappear – over
time, the ‘geography’ of localized populations generally comprises “a patchwork of local
areas differentiated from one another by cultural, racial, or linguistic peculiarities”
(McKenzie, 1968: 73). Human ecologists were among the first to argue that network ties
emerge among actors who are spatially co-located (Park, 1926; Hawley, 1950), perhaps
because the costs of social interaction increase with geographical distance (Lazersfeld
and Merton, 1954).
Spatial considerations have gained a prominent place in the theorizing on organizational
ecology. In their study of the American brewing industry, Carroll and Wade (1991)
claim that processes of legitimation and competition vary by geographic location.
Recently Greve (2000), in his study of the Tokyo banking industry, has shown how the
evolution of a population of organizations within a given geographical area is primarily
shaped by the variation in density of a more narrowly defined geographical area. The
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effect of density is generally stronger at local than non-local levels because both
legitimation and competition are proportional to the degree of physical proximity among
organizations (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Hedstrom, 1994). Furthermore, geographical
differences across markets mirror differences in social structures and innovation
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Saxenian, 1994). Therefore, different geographical areas can
be assimilated to distinct ecologies each bearing a given resource pool and featuring a
distinct selection environment.
In sectors like the professional services with a preponderance of personal (i.e., based on
trust and reputation) and local (i.e., embedded in the existing social fabric) relationships,
the survival of an organization is primarily – though not exclusively – geared to
garnering locally available resources. Firms access and retain such resources by offering
customized services and adapting their practice to the special needs of local clients
(Maister, 1993; Porter, 1980). Over time organizational members can even become the
confidant of clients and strong personal ties often ensue. When organizational members
migrate within the same geographical area, therefore, defecting clients face lower
switching costs: they can readily move with the departing professional. His firm,
therefore, ends up with losing valuable human (e.g., individual skills and knowledge) and
social (e.g., relations with clients) capital to a peer firm, both competing for the same
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scarce resources (e.g., talented professionals and clients). By contrast, since competition
tends to be local, the survival of a firm is less likely at stake when organizational
members migrate beyond the boundaries of a given geographical area. We then
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: The impact of organizational turnover on organizational
dissolution is stronger when the migration of individuals occurs within the same
geographical area.
Turnover may increase the risk of firm dissolution. However, such risk is higher when
organizational turnover produces core rather than peripheral changes in firm attributes
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett, 1993). In her study of small
firms in the early telephone industry, for example, Haveman (1993) has shown how the
succession of a president – generally a more powerful actor – had a stronger impact on
the rate of organizational mortality than the succession of other managers. In the present
context, the harmful effects of turnover vary depending on whether a partner or an
associate exits the firm. In professional service organizations, the partners’ (e.g., the
owners’) human capital is more pertinent to the organization’s profit potential than that
of the associates. As Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostuijn (1998) point out, partners, as
residual claimants, have a greater incentive to use their human capital for the growth and
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the performance of an organization than do associates. Ownership comes with intangible
property rights and diminishes a partner’s propensity to leave. Partners face higher exit
barriers. Not only do they have more business experience, but they also interact more
closely with clients. While partners almost always exit voluntarily, the firm usually
terminates associates when they cannot complete the tournament to partnership.2
Furthermore, a partner’s departure triggers a demographic shift in the firm’s ownership
structure. In short, they are more critical for a firm’s performance and survival as they
have greater influence on organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984;
Sørensen, 2001). Whereas the loss of associates’ human and social capital might be
disruptive, it should be less disruptive than that of partners. Therefore, professional
mobility should be decomposed into movements that involve partners versus those that
involve associates. Since we assume geography (spatial heterogeneity) to moderate the
influence of turnover on organizational dissolution, such movements are supposed to be
more detrimental to the firm if they occur within rather than across different
geographical areas. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The impact of organizational turnover within the same
geographical area or across different geographical areas on organizational dissolution
is stronger when it involves partners rather than associates.
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Hypotheses 2 to 3 refer to the case in which an individual joins another organization –
whatever its geographical location. Organizational turnover affects the environment
surrounding the focal organization through the reallocation of critical resources among
organizations competing in the same limited space (Aldrich, 1999). A different case
exists whenever a new venture emerges in the focal organization’s proximity. Besides the
loss of skills, knowledge and clients, an increase in local density – due to organizational
founding and then increased competition for the very same scarce resources – also
occurs. The survival odds change over time by virtue of organizational turnover
producing new competitors. By contrast, if a new firm is founded in a different province,
the survival chance of the focal firm is unlikely to change, as local ecological conditions
do not necessarily generate a contemporaneous increase in competitive pressures. This
produces the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The risk of organizational dissolution is higher when
organizational turnover results in the creation of new organizations within the same
rather than a different geographical area.
With Hypotheses 2 to 4 we aim to reconcile macro and micro evolutionary processes and
to show their mutual relevance. Individual level phenomena, such as organizational
members leaving an existing firm, trigger population dynamics, i.e. phenomena at a
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higher level. Again, Figure 1 summarizes the key points of the previous discussion. The
effect of turnover on firm dissolution is moderated by locational factors and the status
(partners vs. associates) of defecting members.
DATA
The data we use in this paper are similar to those that Pennings, Lee and van
Witteloostuijn (1998) analyze in their study of the effect of organization-level changes in
human and social capital on organizational dissolution. Data consist of information about
individual professional accountants and individual organizations, and were collected
from the membership lists (or directories) of accountant associations with one- to five-
year intervals. The database records observations on each identified firm approximately
every two years, covering a total of 110 years in 53 observation points (to be more
precise the percentage of our gaps are 1year: 24%, 2years: 60%, 3years: 6%, 4years: 8%,
5years: 2%). These lists provided information on the name, address, background
education and status (partner or associate) of each professional accountant within the
association. We reconstructed the histories of individual organizations by first
aggregating individual level data to that of the firm. The data cover the entire population
of Dutch accounting firms during the period 1880-1986. The complete industry
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comprised 1920 firms over the 106-year period. Choosing one industry as our research
setting reduces unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level.
Dissolution in this paper is consistent with that proposed by Boone, Bröcheler and
Carroll (2000) who define it as exit from the market. Our choice is motivated by the fact
that “failure, in the sense of bankruptcy, cannot be observed in the audit industry and,
therefore, cannot be distinguished from other types of exit” (2000: 368). Thus,
organizational dissolution encompasses different types of exit, ranging from the case
where a single proprietorship vanishes as its owner is no longer listed in the C.P.A.
directories, to the case of dissolution by acquisition (but the professional accountants of
the acquired organization keep working under the acquiring organization), to the case of
dissolution by merger between two or more organizations.3 The notion of organizational
dissolution we use in this paper explains why the final number of firms differs from that
of Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostuijn (1998). Furthermore, since our observation
period ends in 1986, our final population is also smaller than that examined by Boone,
Bröcheler and Carroll – whose study extends till 1992.
We chose the “province” to test the hypothesis on spatial heterogeneity. We divided the
overall population of accounting organizations into 11 sub-populations – each
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corresponding to a different province of The Netherlands. We assumed that they
represent a distinct selection environment. Provinces in The Netherlands are important
administrative and political units (see Lee and Pennings, 2002; Boone, Carroll and van
Witteloostuijn, 2002). Roughly comparable with respect to many resource dimensions,
the provinces have clear and distinguishable local identities. For instance, some
provinces are predominantly Protestant while others are mainly Catholic. Due to their
small size, many organizations compete at the local (province) level and their critical
resources (talented professionals and new clients) are local as well. Furthermore, the
capital investments to start up a new venture are low. The accounting service industry is
in fact “entirely a personal service industry” (Benston, 1985: 47). Figure 2 illustrates its
evolving fragmented character during the window of the present study. Concentration of
the industry was measured by using the relative market share of the four largest firms
(C4) over the period 1880-1986. Therefore, although some firms have over time
expanded the scope of their activity beyond the provincial boundaries, the province still
ought to be considered the relevant environment for most of the firms.
Starting in the late 1960s, the Dutch accounting service industry has witnessed several
fundamental regulatory changes. Because of more stringent requirements – for example,
the need for higher levels of education and experience, and the examination to become
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C.P.A. – the entry of potential competitors has been restricted. Small firms appear to be
most disadvantaged by the costs imposed by regulations. The industry has indeed
evolved from being virtually unregulated to being extensively regulated. In particular,
four major regulatory changes have encompassed both the supply and the demand of
professional accounting services. In 1966, with the Law on Registered Accountants, one
professional organization or NIvRA (Nederlands Instituut van Register Accountants) was
created. Since then, every professional accountant in public practice has become one of
its members. The organization has the right to establish disciplinary rules and grant the
Registered Accountant (RA) license. The license is granted on condition that a
prospective auditor acquires “knowledge of complicated audit techniques (such as
statistical sampling, risk analysis and analytical review) and extensive knowledge of
financial accounting (measurement methods, regulations and standards)” (Maijoor and
van Witteloostuijn, 1996: 555). The regulation has then greatly contributed to the
enhancement of the quality of human capital within the industry. Rules of conduct for
auditors were prescribed with the Professional Code of Registered Auditors in 1972.
As to the demand side, in 1970 the Act on Annual Accounts of Companies (which took
effect in 1971) enlarged the number of firms required by law of disclosing audited annual
accounts. In addition to ‘open’ public companies, large private firms and cooperative
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societies were also included. Finally, in 1983 the number was further enlarged with the
Title 8 of Book 2 of the Civil Code: every company, public or private, and every
cooperative society was forced to disclose audited annual accounts. After the
promulgation of definitive guidelines in 1984, the obligation remained less compulsory
for small and medium-sized firms that were “allowed to submit abridged annual
accounts” (Boone, Bröcheler and Carroll, 2000: 366). By forcing demand for audit
services (auditing and disclosure requirements), the 1970 and 1983 regulations have
contributed to enhancing even more the value of human capital. While raising the entry
barriers into the profession, in fact, these regulations have also fostered the demand for
auditing services by increasing the number of firms requiring such services. As human
capital has become a scarce resource, the retention of talents is therefore crucial for the
long-term viability of a firm.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We tested Hypothesis 1 by creating a time-varying variable – Turnover – by taking the
logarithm of the number of professional accountants that left the focal firm in a given
year.4 We logged the variable because, as other studies, we assume that the impact of the
number of departing members would increase at a decreasing rate (e.g., Rao, Greve and
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Davis, 2001). While certain levels of turnover are associated with certain disruptions, the
defection of the very first member is likely to be much more dramatic in jeopardizing the
integrity of professional partnerships. Partners embody a cohesive group, with a strong
ésprit de corps where admission occurs only after a lengthy 10-12 year tournament. A
walk-out is profoundly disturbing and might expose a larger fissure and an erstwhile
stable structure becomes a house of cards. In their study of turnover Krackhardt and
Porter have suggested that the defection of one’s confidant often engenders a ‘snowball
effect’ on the premise that “the effects of turnover on stayers will not be uniformly nor
randomly distributed among the stayers in the organization. Rather, these effects will be
localized and focused on those stayers who are closest to those who left. The social
network, then describes the topology of forces that reverberate throughout an
organization when someone leaves” (1985: 246). It is therefore plausible to argue that the
first defection is much more harmful for a partnership compared to subsequent defections
that are often triggered by the very first one. That is why we assign disproportionate
more weight to initial exits. The disproportionate effect of the first mover can be
dramatized with a twisted metaphor: the very first person breaking the partners’ truce has
an undue influence on its aftermath (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
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A potential problem in our analysis is the direction of causality. Turnover might be an
effect rather than a cause of organizational dissolution as individuals are more likely to
quit their job when their firm is performing poorly and then “death is sneaking around
the corner” (see Wagner, 1999). To get around this issue, we lagged the variable by one
period to “ensure exogeneity with respect to the dependent variable” (Swaminathan,
2001: 1176). Since in our data a period ranges from a one- to a five-year interval (for
76% of the firms in our database one-period lag corresponds to 2 to 5 years), the one-
period lag allows controlling for the risk of reverse causality. Furthermore, since several
firms in our sample are single proprietorships (size = 1), in the absence of replacement
the departure of the owner of the firm amounts to organizational dissolution. We then
restricted our analysis to those individual firms where the departing individual is
replaced with a new one (ex: the son who follows into the father’s footsteps). In other
words, we look at those cases where turnover does not sanction the outright end of a
firm’s professional activity, but the replacement ensures its continuity at least for a
while. We also estimated all models restricting the analysis of the impact of turnover
only to firms with size > 1. Though not reported, the results are qualitatively similar to
those presented in the paper.
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Besides retiring, becoming unemployed or even abandoning the industry, departing
individuals can join a competitor or start up a new venture. Since our analysis is
primarily concerned with the last two cases, we focused only on the movements of
individuals that remained in the industry after leaving their firm. Therefore, the
organizational members who join a competitor or found a new firm are only a subset of
all defecting individuals. In keeping with research on spatial heterogeneity, we
distinguished between movements of professional accountants within or across provinces
(Hypothesis 2). In particular, we created two variables – MemberExit-within-Province
and MemberExit-across-Provinces – that measure how many individual C.P.A.s each
year start working for another organization – whether already existing or newly founded
– within the same province or a different one, respectively. Following the
aforementioned reasoning, we expressed them in logarithmic form.
Furthermore, we split the previous two variables into four variables – namely,
PartnerExit-within-Province and PartnerExit-across-Provinces, AssociateExit-within-
Province and AssociateExit-across-Provinces – to distinguish between movements that
involve partners and those that involve associates (Hypothesis 3). These new variables –
again expressed in logarithmic form – measure the number of partners and associates that
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each year left the focal company to join a competitor within the same province or a
different one.
The migration of professional accountants does not simply entail joining another
organization. New organizations may be founded as well (Hypothesis 4). We then
created a dummy variable – Start-ups-inside-Province – taking on the value of 1
whenever one or more professional accountants left an existing organization to start up a
new venture within the same province, otherwise 0. By contrast, for the case in which
new firms are founded in a different province we added a dummy variable – Start-ups-
outside-Province – taking on the value of 1 when one or more professional accountants
left an existing organization to start up a new venture in a different province, otherwise
0. Both variables are dummies, not continuous variables, because we are not interested in
the number of newly founded firms per se. Rather, we want to pinpoint every time
turnover leads to the formation of a new firm either inside or outside the focal province.
The actual number of newly founded firms – as a result of turnover or otherwise – is in




As the history of the Dutch accounting service industry has been marked by many
important historical events that might well account for organization dissolution in
specific years, in our models we included several control variables. In particular, we
sought to disentangle exogenous forces of evolutionary change, which are discernable at
either the national or the entire industry levels (e.g., worldwide conflicts or changes in
the institutional environment, etc.), from endogenous forces of evolutionary change that,
on the contrary, operate at a lower level (e.g., movements of professional accountants).
Two dummies were created for governmental regulation dealing with World War I
conditions during 1914-1918 and for the occurrence of World War II (1941-1946). The
government Regulation of 1929, in the wake of the Great Depression, was presumed to
be most impactful during 1929 and 1930 (1 if year = 1929 and = 1930, 0 otherwise).
Another institutional event was the emergence of a Single Association (or NIvRA),
which represented the collective interests of all Dutch accounting organizations and was
established in 1966 (1 if year > 1966, 0 otherwise). The effect of the regulatory changes
enforced in 1971 and 1984 – which significantly heightened the demand for audit
services – was captured by two dummy variables, namely Regulation of 1971 (1 if year >
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1971) and Regulation of 1984 (1 if year > 1984). We used the rate of unemployment
(Unemployment) – a time-varying variable measured at the national level – to control for
some of the circumstances under which the migration of professional accountants is
more/less frequently observed. We tried to estimate the extent to which more general
phenomena affect the creation of new organizations (e.g., bandwagon effect) with the
inclusion of density at the national level – National Density – and at the provincial level
– Focal-Province-Density. A measure of the level of concentration of the industry – C4,
e.g., the total market share of the top 4 firms – was also included to control for the impact
that the number of organizations populating the industry has on organization dissolution.
In the presence of high levels of concentration, just a few organizations control most of
the available resources (Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980). But the risk of dissolution might also
be influenced by how many firms were created or disappeared each year – which is a
reflection of the degree of munificence of the environment. We then included two
variables – BirthTotal and DeathTotal – that measure the number of firms founded and
dissolved nationwide the previous year, respectively.
To control for spatial heterogeneity at the province level, we created three variables. The
first is given by the number of inhabitants in each province – Provincial Inhabitants – a
time-varying variable deemed to capture variations in carrying capacity (e.g., number of
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potential clients). The other two variables – BirthProvince and DeathProvince – control
for the number of firms founded or dissolved the previous year within a given province,
respectively. The considerations made before for likewise variables nationwide do still
hold in this case.
Several control variables were also created at the organization level. We controlled for
the Leverage ratio – Leverage – namely the number of associates per partner for each
year. According to Maister (1993), when the ratio is high there are fewer career
opportunities and then higher levels of turnover. Young talented professionals are in fact
likely to seek new job opportunities elsewhere. We measured organization size – Size –
by taking the logarithm of the number of accountants associated with an organization
each year. Large organizations provide associates with more career opportunities and by
implication are more likely to retain talented professionals. Following the reasoning of
Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (1993), we also constructed a duration clock variable
recording the time elapsed since the last organizational exit – Time-since-last-Exit –
whatever the nature of that exit (e.g., migration of professionals within the same province
or across different provinces). The value of the clock is 0 until the occurrence of a
change in which case the clock records the time elapsed before any previous exit. The
clock is then reset again to 0 to record the time elapsing prior to any new change. Time is
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measured in years since an event. When the clock is reset to 0 the hazard rate increases.
Yet, as the time goes by the hazard rate should diminish. As for individual firms the exit
of the owner also implies organizational dissolution, we created a dummy – Single
proprietorship – taking on the value 1 if size = 1 and 0 otherwise. Finally, we controlled
for organization age – Age – that is, the number of years elapsed since the founding of an
organization. Because of their lack of external legitimacy, such firms often experience
higher levels of liability of newness (Singh, Tucker and House, 1986). Yet, even older
organizations often need to withstand the harmful effects of disruptions in deeply
embedded routines (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). Finally,
we sought to estimate the role of experiential knowledge and the duration of the
relationships with clients at the firm level by creating Local Experience, a time-varying
variable given by the logarithm of the sum of the number of years each professional
accountant has been working for an organization in the province until the observation
year. Table 1 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables we use in our




In building the dataset, we considered the year in which the organization appeared for the
first time on the Register of Accountants as the founding year, whereas the last year
appearance as the year of dissolution of the same organization. We divided the life of
each organization in organization-years (Allison, 1984; Tuma and Hannan, 1984). The
final dataset includes the life of 1920 firms divided into 17,491 year-segments. For the
analysis we used event history techniques. Our dependent variable is the instantaneous








Different functions of time and different covariates can be used to model the hazard rate
of each organization. Given the inconsistent findings on parametric formulation of the
rate of age-dependence, a less restrictive way to model it has been recently suggested
(Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). For this reason, we chose to use a flexible model, the
piecewise exponential, which allows the rate to vary in an unrestricted fashion from one
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interval to the other at pre-selected ages. More precisely, the age of an organization is
divided into intervals and the hazard is constant within each interval but can vary across
them. We define a set of J intervals, dividing the age variable at precise points (a1, a2, a3,
a4… aj), where a0 = 0 e aj = . The interval J is given by [aj-1, aj) and the hazard of the
firm i is defined by:
j1perexp aaax],[=r(t) j-j <≤′βµ
or
where j = log j. This formulation allows the intercept of the log-hazard function to vary
at different cut-points (Allison, 1995). Our choice of the intervals was driven by the
principle of equal number of observations for each category. We then divided the age of
the firm in the following six segments: Age1 (0.5-3 years), Age2 [3-6 years), Age3 [6-10
years), Age4 [10-16 years), Age5 [16-29 years) and Age6 (29-onward years). As already
pointed out, the covariates were lagged by one period to avoid problems of simultaneity.
We estimated the hazard rate of the organization i at the age a – namely ri(a) – as a
ij xar ')(log 1 βα +=
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function of a vector of firm characteristics, w, and of a vector of environmental variables
measured at different levels of analysis, z, using the following model:
],zw[a=(a)r iaiaji ''exp)( γϕµ +⋅
We chose a model of continuous representation of the events to highlight the continuity
of the social processes behind the dissolution of an organization.5 As some of the models
described in the next section are not nested, following Lomi (1995), we compared them
using the 2ρ statistics (Horowitz, 1983). The 2ρ test for model specification is a
likelihood ratio test adjusted to account for differences in degrees of freedom across non-




L ff ηρ −−=
where Lf is the log-likelihood of the full model, f is the number of parameters, and L(0)
is the log-likelihood of the restricted model containing a constant term only. The model
with the highest 2ρ value is the one that best fits the data. We introduced fixed effects
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at the province level to account for systematic geographical differences in dissolution
propensity. Lastly, all the estimates were obtained using Maximum Likelihood
estimation method using version 7 of STATA.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for piecewise exponential models of
organizational dissolution. Model 1 includes all the control variables. In Model 2, we
added the variable Turnover to test Hypothesis 1. In Model 3, we introduced the
variables MemberExit-within-Province and MemberExit-across-Provinces to test
Hypothesis 2. In Model 4, we replaced the previous two variables with PartnerExit-in-
Province, AssociateExit-in-Province, PartnerExit-across-Provinces and AssociateExit-
across-Provinces to test Hypothesis 3. Finally, in Model 5, we tested Hypothesis 4 by
including the variables Start-up-inside-Province and Start-up-outside-Province.
The baseline model (Model 1) with all control variables shows that the government
regulations following the 1929 crisis affected the risk of organizational dissolution.
Whereas the creation of the single association (NIvRA), the regulatory measures taken to
withstand the occurrence of World War II and the boost in the demand for auditing
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services caused by the 1984 regulation raised such risk, the others reduced it. The level
of industrial concentration (C4) is in the expected direction but it is non-significant.
Moreover, the effect of the dummies related to the Age variable suggests the existence of
a curvilinear effect between age and failure: accountant firms are more likely to dissolve
either when they are very young or when they become old. Although not presented here,
we also estimated a model including a curvilinear specification for age, but the model
exhibited a lower fit with the data.
First partial support for the spatial heterogeneity hypothesis can be found in the
coefficients estimates of the variables measuring the impact of ecological variables on
failure rates, namely the number of firms born (BirthProvince and BirthTotal), and
dissolved (DeathProvince and DeathTotal) during the previous year within the same
province and nationwide, respectively. Although the coefficients for densities are not
significant, the estimate obtained by measuring the impact of organizational births
locally is roughly two times that obtained at the national level; by the same token, the
impact of dissolutions at the provincial level is significant and five times greater than that
of organizations dissolved at the national level. Qualitatively these results suggest that
the survival chances of the focal organization are associated with the evolutionary (vital)
dynamics of local populations. In a similar vein, greater experiential knowledge of the
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geographical area (Local Experience) enables a firm to more effectively cope with the
disruptive consequences induced by organizational turnover.
The estimates obtained for the coefficient of the variable Turnover support our
Hypothesis 1 (Model 2). A turnover event significantly raises the risk of organizational
dissolution. As the estimates suggest, when 5 members leave their firm, for example, the
hazard rate of organizational dissolution increases by approximately 22%
[exp(0.126*ln(5)]. Mirroring the results founded by Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (1993)
on the effect of organizational change, our study provides evidence on the curvilinear
relationships between professionals’ exits on firm dissolution: the deleterious
consequences of this event decrease over time (Time-Since-Last-Exit) until it reaches a
minimum threshold, after which the organization is unable to withstand new exits – as
shown by its quadratic effect.
Model 3 provides support for Hypothesis 2. The risk of organizational dissolution
increases when turnover translates into the migration of professionals from firm to firm
within the same province or outside. Adding these two variables improves significantly
the fit of our model (2[L7  L6]  =  167.1  with  2  d.f.).  The  coefficients  of  the  variables 




it  occurs  outside  it  [χ2=5.68  p<.05  with  1  d.f.].  As  the  estimates  suggest,  when  5 
members  leave  their  firm  to  join  a  competitor  within  the  same  geographical  area,  for 
example,  the hazard  rate of organizational dissolution  increases by approximately 19% 
[exp(0.11*ln(5)]. Interestingly,  this formulation of the model amplifies the effect of the 
size variable, significantly increasing the beneficial consequences of it on organizational 
dissolution. We  interpret  this  result as  related  to  the superior ability of bigger  firms  in 
managing professionals’  migrations. 
 
In  Model  4  we  distinguished  between  movements  involving  partners  and  movements 
involving  associates.  Consistently  with  Hypothesis  3,  the  risk  of  organizational 
dissolution  is  much  higher  when  partners  leave  the  focal  firm  to  join  a  competitor, 
especially if the latter is located within the same geographical area [χ2=5.10 p<.05 with 1 
d.f.]. This suggests  that an  important part of the increment in the risk of organizational 






than  that of partners, as  indicated by  the difference  in magnitude of  the coefficients of 
the variables measuring such movements (.081 vs. .038).  
 
Model  5  further  confirms  the  spatial  heterogeneity hypothesis. Organizational  turnover 
leading to the creation of a new firm within the same province significantly increases the 
hazard of dissolution. The coefficient of the variable Start-ups-inside-Province is highly 
significant  and  in  the  expected  (positive)  direction  (Hypothesis4).  By  contrast,  the 
coefficient of the variable measuring the impact of starting a new venture in a different 
province  (Start-ups-outside-Province) –  though  is  in  the opposite direction  to what we 
were  expecting –  is only marginally  significant  (p < 0.1). Besides  the potential  loss of 





enough,  after  accounting  for  the  spatial  heterogeneous  dynamics  of  professionals’  













strong  effects  of  turnover  on  organizational  dissolution.  Second,  we  showed  how 





of  firm  dissolution.  Exit  of  professionals  is  indeed  highly  damaging  for  professional 
services  firms. Professional  services  firms compete not only  for clients, but  for human 





professional  exit  is  most  damaging  to  the  firm  when  it  unfolds  at  the  local  level  and 
involves partners rather  than associates. The exodus of professionals to remote firms is 
not nearly as profound as  is  the exodus  to proximate ones. Most harmful  is  the exit of 
professionals  who  start  their  own  firm  within  the  same  geographical  area  where  the 
original firm is located. Full account of the impact of organizational turnover, therefore, 





of  organizational  practices  and  relationships  (Uzzi,  1997).  Social  networks,  whether 
internal or external, become cultivated locally and transforming them may translate into 
diminished organizational performance. The exit of professionals very often amounts to 
jolts,  upheavals  and  other  forms  of  organizational  change  and  discontinuity.  Such 
changes  are  most  paramount  when  turnover  occurs  within  the  focal  firm’ s  immediate 
geographic  proximity.  In  keeping  with  the  hypothesis  on  spatial  heterogeneity, 
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competition  among  firms  tends  to  be  local.  Geography  and  inter-firm  mobility  display 
important  main  and  interaction  effects  on  firm  survival.  However,  other  ways  to 
disentangle  these  relationships  may  produce  even  stronger  results.  For  example,  the 
choice of province as a meaningful social entity for uncovering spatially heterogeneous 
hazard  patterns  might  be  questioned.  Provinces  are  administrative  units  with  tenuous 
boundaries,  less  so  cohesive,  well-bounded  social  communities.  Therefore,  our  results 
should  be  much  stronger  if we had geographically  less  ambiguous  social  entities –  for 
example,    “ conurbation” ,  Statistical  Metropolitan  Areas  (SMAs)  or  industrial  districts. 
Nevertheless,  our  study  of  provinces  signals  that  geography  should  not  be  disregarded 
and  that  in  fact propinquity  embodies  an  important  influence of  localized  learning and 
inter-firm knowledge transfer. 
 




competitive  advantages.  Conversely,  a  firm’ s  shifting  contemporaneous  density  and 





heterogeneity  is  rooted  in  contextual  or  cognitive  differences.  Distinct  geographical 
areas, for instance, may differ because of institutional, historical, socio-economic reasons 
that ultimately affect the type and the amount of resources locally available. On the other 
hand,  as  Porac  et  al.  (1995) demonstrated,  firms are  likely  to  see  as  competitors  those 
firms  that  operate  in  their  proximity.  This  also  echoes  with  our  study  where  firms  are 
small and clients tend to be local. Yet, only a more fine-grained analysis, with qualitative 
data  can  shed  light  on  the  pre-eminent  validity  of  cognitive  explanations.  Future 
research, therefore, may find this question worth exploring. 
 
These  results  implore  us  to  move  towards  a  joint  consideration  of  macro-  and  micro-
evolutionary processes and to show their interconnectedness. Individual level phenomena 
(the  departure  from  an  existing  organization)  trigger  phenomena  at  a  higher  level 
(organizational  and  ecological  changes)  that  ultimately  create  the  conditions  for  the 
former  to  come  about.  In  this  sense,  the  results  show  how  turnover  is  an  important 
endogenous  force  shaping  the  evolution  of  localized  populations  of  organizations. 
Individuals’  choice behavior does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it is often determined 
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by  availability  of  vacancy  in  other  occupations  and  other  firms.  Population  level 
conditions  obviously  also  play  a  major  role  in  the  market  for  professional  labor 
(Haveman  and  Cohen,  1994).  During  periods  of  entrepreneurial  vigor,  high  levels  of 
professionals’   migrations  can  be  observed,  while  during  spells  of  gloom  and  when 
bankruptcies  abound,  employees  wait  and  sit  out  the  storm.  In  short,  organizational 
turnover is partly a function of the current landscape. Likewise, fluctuating rates of firm 
dissolution  and  founding  produce  variations  in  population  parameters,  most  notably 
density.  And  these  parameters,  in  turn,  trigger  organizational  turnover,  and  so  on. 
Frameworks  and  analysis  strategies  for  jointly  considering  different  levels  should 
therefore  be  developed.  The  present  study  ought  to  be  seen  in  a  wider  context  where 





consulting.  Similar  mobility  patterns  are  in  fact  common  in  high-tech  industries  (e.g., 
software, biotech, semiconductor) where the survival of existing organizations crucially 
hinges  on  knowledge-based  resources.  Similarly,  in  those  industries  where  reputation 
plays  a  critical  role  (e.g.,  fashion)  organizational  turnover  may  significantly  affect  the 
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hazard rate of organizational dissolution. Not surprisingly, firms often strive to retain key 
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Table 1 (continued - independent variables) 
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Log Likelihood  7686.36  7721.43  7804.92  7801.44  7876.5
1 
 
         
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BirthProvince  =  number  of  firms  born  at  provincial  level  the  period  before  the 
observation. 




Size  =  logarithm  of  the  number  of  professionals  (partners  and  associates)  per  firm  per 
year. 





MemberExit-within-Province  =  logarithm  of  the  number  of  professionals  leaving  the 
firm and joining a firm within the same province (+ .001) each year. 












Start-ups-inside-Province  =  dummy  taking  on  1  if  exit  leads  to  the  creation  of  a  new 
firm within the same province, 0 otherwise.  
Start-ups-outside-Province = dummy taking on 1  if exit  leads to the creation of a new 
firm in a different province, 0 otherwise. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 They define social capital as “ the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or 
social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized 
through that network”  (1998: 154). 
2
 Although our data do not allow us to precisely distinguish cases of voluntary turnover 
(resignation) from cases of involuntary turnover (dismissal), in general partners interrupt 
voluntarily their relationship with their firm, while associates are asked to leave (Maister, 1993). 
For a first empirical investigation of the factors affecting voluntary and involuntary turnover see 
Stumpf and Dawley (1981). 
3
 Since starting in the late 1960s throguh international mergers and acquisitions the Dutch 
acconting industry has become increasingly concentrated, we checked whether the results might be 
affected by our notion of dissolution. In particular, we conducted a sensitivity analysis including 
only the data till the end of the 1960s. The results, which are available from the authors, are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper. 
4
 We estimated the model also expressing Turnover in relative terms (i.e., exit rate). Again, the 
results turned out to be equivalent.  
5 The estimates obtained using a complementary log-log model, here not reported, offered values 
qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper. 
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